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Abstract. The paper presents one methodology of calculating the tariff equivalent of the 
tariff-rate quota as a particular case of a non-tariff barrier for an agricultural product 
imported in Romania based on recommendations in international literature. The tariff 
equivalent of tariff-rate quota of imports from the EU is approximately 35%, lower than 
the tariff outside the quota. Nonetheless this is considerable higher when compared with 
the Common External Tariff (CET). Elimination of the nominal protection level as 
consequence of the adoption the CET is expected to stimulate imports pressure especially 
from price competitive import partners both from EU (such as Slovakia, Belgium, 
Austria, Czech Republic and Italy) and non EU countries (Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Croatia). A basic model forecasts that, with the lowered 
protection, annual imports will rise with at least 13.5 thousand tonnes, thus an increase 
of 23% compared with the average annual imports during 1990-2005. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Unlike the much more transparent tariffs, non-tariff barriers (subsequently called 
NTB’s) are a relatively new and insufficiently explored sector of international economic 
relations. Although they have been traditionally used for over 7 centuries
1, their importance 
for international trade flows has reached its peak towards the end of the 20
th century.  
For instance, in 2004, the number of lines in a customs list which was representative 
for the world average directly affected by the implementation of at least one non-tariff 
measure was 5620. That is a growth of over 200% compared to 1994, when the number of 
lines was only 1880, finding that gave support to the some economists’ claim that the reverse 
of the decrease in tariff protection agreed at the end of the Uruguay Round was the 
recrudescence of non-tariff protectionism (Fugazza, 2006:2).  
The importance of non-tariff measures for the future of trade flows is especially 
enhanced since the lack of an agreement in this field led to the suspension of negotiations 
during the Doha Round. Non-tariff barriers have thus become a global apple of discord, 
causing disputes that involve both developing countries and especially developed countries 
                                                      
1 Some forms of non-tariff proto-protectionism are, for example, the interdictions regarding the export of non-
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(or blocks of countries). In this context, the preoccupations regarding the quantification of the 
effects produced by these non-tariff measures, especially at the level of the protected 
economy (but also at the level of the trade partners) become a priority for the continuation of 
the multilateral negotiations in a rational, positive manner. 
The preoccupations for the quantification of the non-tariff barriers have generated 
several methods for this purpose, among which the tariff equivalent method, frequently used 
both by the World Bank economists (Bora, 2002:8) and by researchers, due to its capacity of 
being applied to a vast range of NTB’s (Deardorff, 1997), such as quotas, variable levies, 
voluntary export restrictions and technical barriers
2. 
During the recent years, the implementation of annual tariff-rate quotas for the 
Romanian imports from EU countries has played an indirect role of safety valve for the 
introduction of competitive pressures (limited by the maximum level of the quotas) which 
might have helped the internal producers to adjust to the competitive pressures of the Single 
Market. With its accession into the European Union in 2007, Romania takes on the EU 
Common External Tariff, while the tariff-rate quotas are allotted in a centralised manner by 
the European Commission. In this context, the disappearance of the current degree of 
protection provided by the tariffs outside the quotas to the internal producers creates the 
necessity to identify and calibrate alternative instruments for alleviating the impact of the 
exposure to the competition pressures – especially those of the Single Market –, which must 
be based on the quantification of the previous nominal protection provided to the internal 
producers by the tariff rate quotas. The computation of the tariff equivalent for tariff rate 
quotas applied to an agricultural product imported in Romania is also collinear with 
international global concerns and recommendations
3 to amplify actions necessary to calculate 
tariff equivalents for an extensive range of products, industries and economies which in turn 
shall facilitate further development of econometric model to study the international trade 
idiosyncrasies in response to NTB reduction. 
Below, we shall give an example of the way of calculating the tariff equivalent of a 
specific form of non-tariff measure, i.e. the tariff-rate quota, selectively applied to the imports 
of potatoes in Romania after 1989, based on historical data provided by the FAOSTAT – 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. We have chosen this type of non-
tariff barrier
4 as an example based on both the increase in the frequency of the use of tariff-
rate quotas during the last decade and the greater transparency of tariff-rate quotas, compared 
to other non-tariff measures. 
                                                      
2 For example, Mitsuyo Ando in “Estimating Tariff Equivalents of Core and Non-Core Non-Tariff Measures in 
the APEC Member Economies” used this method to quantify – for 13 APEC countries and 21 products – the 
tariff equivalent of no less than 12 kinds of NTB’s, classified into 5 categories (from price measures, such as 
variable levies, compensatory measures, antidumping measures etc up to quantitative measures, such as tariff-
rate quotas and RVE, technical, monopolistic or monitoring measures). The calculation was also facilitated by 
the fact that, after having obtained the price differential for the same product and having eliminated the 
percentage of tariff protection, Ando allotted the non-tariff protection for each product according to a distortion 
index of prices, specific to each NTB and calculated based on a regression developed around the frequency 
indicators that are specific to the 12 NTB’s. 
3 “Therefore, we conclude from this survey that the most useful direction for future investigation of NTBs across 
industries and countries should be to aim for a comprehensive set of tariff-equivalent measures of protection 
(nominal, not effective) derived from the most detailed industry-specific information that can be obtained and 
from various different measurement techniques appropriate to the type of NTB and its method of administration” 
(Deardorff,1997:44) 
4 From an academic point of view, the tariff-rate quotas are included in the area of non-tariff measures, although, 
within official taxonomies (UNCTAD, 2005:16-19), they may be classified as tariff measures. In Deardorff 
(Deardorff, 1997:68) and Ferrantino (Ferrantino, 2006:30), the mention is implicit, as long as the NTB 
evaluation measures include the quantification of tariff-rate quotas, while in Bora, they are explicitly included 
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2. CALCULATING THE TARIFF EQUIVALENT OF THE NTB 
Some of the less used, but implicitly accepted definitions of the NTB’s states that they 
are, like tariff barriers, measures that, by creating obstacles in accessing markets, prevent the 
functioning of the single-price law. According to this law, a market without obstacles, by 
means of a series of successive arbitrages, will end up being characterised by the existence of 
a single price for the same goods (or similar, 100% substitute goods) after the adjustments 
needed for taking into consideration the transportation and distribution costs (at least in the 
case of a competitive economy and the global economy in general – if we eliminate tariff and 
non-tariff restrictions – is, by its atomic character, the closest to the image of a perfectly 
competitive economy)
5.  
As a result, the quantification of the impact of the NTB at the level of the protected 
economy can be obtained by measuring this price variation whose effect is the separation of 
the internal price on the protected market from the single reference price which would have 
prevailed if the NTB hadn’t been enforced and by dividing this price gap to the price of the 
product in order to express it as a tariff. In other words, finding the tariff equivalent of a NTB 
implies finding that level of the tariff which would have the same effect on imports as a 
caeteris paribus enforcement of the NTB. 
From a methodological point of view, the main challenges of measuring the NTB 
starting from the price gap consist in the choices (Deardorff, 1997:13) we have to make 
regarding the prices and the calculation method to be used. 
Thus, observing both the above-mentioned price categories is difficult in practice 
(especially the price that would have prevailed on the market in the absence of the NTB, 
which in order to found one would have to make a series of unreliable assumptions 
concerning the elasticity of the demand under the circumstances of free exchange), so that, 
most of the time, the literature in the field recommends using the difference between the 
internal price and the CIF import price of the product in the presence of the NTB as a 
substitute (Deardorff
 ,1997:14). 
From a formal point of view, the tariff equivalent of the NTB should, in theory, be 
deduced based on the relative differential between the reference price (in the absence of any 
NTB) of the imported product and the price of the product on the internal market from which 
tariff protection is deducted according to a generic formula described by the following 
equation
6: 
j
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Rj ij
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= 100  
where 
ET – is the tariff equivalent of the NTB, implicitly expressed as a percentage for 
product j 
Pij – is the internal market price for the imported product  
PRj – is the reference price of the imported product that would have prevailed on the 
market in the absence of the NTB 
X – is the currency exchange rate 
tj – is the usual level of tariff protection for the imported product 
When approaching this calculation method, one must take into account the fact that the 
free trade situation with no NTB is an abstract notion with no correspondent in the reality of 
current international relations. Therefore, for the PRj reference price of the product under the 
circumstances of the zero presence of the NTB, practice has imposed the use of a substitute 
that is as close as possible to the content of this price, i.e. the world reference price of this 
product (since the world market is the closest to the perfect competition circumstances). At 
the same time, this price needs to be corrected in order to take into consideration the costs of 
transportation to the importing country (to obtain the relevant level for the arbitrages so as to 
                                                      
5 See Bora’s definition for the NTB (Bora, 2005:18). 
6 Other variants and particularisations of this formula may be found in Ferrantino (Ferrantino, 2006:65-68). 162  PETRU CĂTĂLIN BODEA 
obtain the single price), which consequently justifies choosing an average level of the CIF 
calculated import price (thus including the transportation and insurance costs, but without 
including the customs duties) as a correspondent of the reference price. 
On the other hand, the Pij, i.e. the internal market price for the imported product, is a 
notion whose transparency is just as difficult to obtain with most of the usual statistics as that 
of the PRj, so that it is necessary to take alternatives into account. Thus, most of the time, the 
official statistics regarding the level of internal prices do not differentiate between imported 
and national products, providing a single price level for that particular product. The internal 
market price is thus a composite coefficient between the price of the substitute internal 
products (if any) and that of the imported products. Consequently, the alternatives for 
calculating the Pij depend on the existence of a similar internal product and on its capacity of 
being substituted with the imported product. Thus, if that internal product exists and is 
perfectly changeable with the imported one, Deardorff recommends accepting the factory 
production price of the internal product as a reference level for the Pij (Deardorff
 , 1997:65). 
3. THE TARIFF-RATE QUOTAS APPLIED TO THE POTATO IMPORTS 
IN ROMANIA AFTER 1989 
The tariff-rate quota system is a practice that became more widespread as a result of 
the decisions assumed by the GATT member countries within the URAA - The Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture (1996) to open the internal markets for the import of 
agricultural products. Before the end of the round, most of these products were subjected to a 
system of restrictive import quotas, which were later replaced by the tariff-rate quota system, 
the estimate being that the Uruguay Round led to the creation of over 1,300 new tariff-rate 
quotas (Skully, 2001:1). 
From a methodological point of view, a tariff-rate quota may be assimilated to a two-
level tariff, where the lower level is applied to the imports within a certain quota, whereas the 
higher one applies to all imports going over the quota (Ferrantino, 2006:30). A tariff-rate 
quota (subsequently called CT) is thus defined by 3 variables (Liapis, 2002:4):  
  the tariff within the quota (subsequently called Tc, which is the low value of the tariff, 
applied to the imports that do not go over the volume of the quota), 
  the quota (subsequently called C, which is the quantity of imports accepted with the low 
level of the tariff Tc) and 
  the tariff outside the quota (subsequently called Ti, which is the value of the tariff applied 
to the imports going over the C; it is much more prohibitive than the Tc and the Ti/ Tc ratio 
is often above 10).  
The information concerning the level of all of these 3 dimensions characterising a 
tariff-rate quota are public, as is the way of managing the quota (which needs a notification 
from the WTO) and, moreover, they are comparable with regard to countries and products. 
Before the moment of the accession into the European Union and the adoption of the 
EU Common External Tariff, Romania’s import regime could be considered a liberal one (in 
the conservative sense of the word) due to the lack of import quotas and of the importers’ 
obligation to obtain an import licence, as Article 1 in the Government Decision 1526/2003 
mentions that “the export and import of goods from and to the customs territory of Romania is 
free, not being conditioned by the issuing of licences”. The exceptions from the provisions of 
Article 1 were the goods subjected to measures such as the prohibitions justified by reasons of 
public safety, the protection of people’s health and lives, the protection of intellectual 
property etc, the import safeguarding measures, the export or import monitoring measures etc.  
Except for the non-automatic licences for certain sensitive products (radioactive 
materials, substances used for producing drugs, toxic waste etc) and for the safeguarding 
measures introduced for the sugar imports, predominantly from the Republic of Moldova
7, 
                                                      
7  For example, for the year 2006, Article 1 of the Government Decision 1761/22.12.2005 stipulates: “A 
safeguarding measure is enforced within the Free Trade Agreement between Romania and the Republic of   The tariff equivalent of tariff-rate quotas…  163 
some of the few NTBs in the field of quantitative restrictions practiced by Romania after 1989 
were the tariff-rate quotas generally applied to the agricultural products coming from EU, 
CEFTA or South-Eastern European countries (Turkey, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia and 
Montenegro) and Israel. 
An important part among these NTBs was played by the tariff-rate quotas enforced for 
the import of potatoes from the European Union. During the years when these quotas were 
implemented, the average maximum quantity admitted for import was that of 20,000 tons of 
potatoes coming from the European Union, for which the preferential customs duty was of 
18.8% (while the customs duty outside the quota was somewhere between 40% and 50%, 
according to the period of the year when the import occurred), with an average maximum 
allotment quota of 0.3% / import licence managed according to the “first come, first served” 
principle corroborated – during the recent years – with the preferential allotment of quotas to 
traditional importers (importers that, during the past years, applied for import quotas and 
actually used them entirely). 
The product that the case study directly focuses on is potatoes fresh or chilled other 
than seeds HS 0701909090
8. Choosing this product as a subject for the study was based on a 
series of arguments especially related to its homogenous character and to the existence of the 
national substitute, to its dynamics, supported by the Romanian agricultural imports in the 
context of a decline of the internal producers’ competitiveness, and to the fact that the tariff-
rate quotas applied to the import of potatoes in Romania were always entirely used; all these 
arguments are briefly presented below. 
In order to ensure price compatibility, applying the conventional “price gap” method 
for finding the tariff equivalent of the tariff-rate quota requires a very good substitution 
between the imported product and the internal one, in other words lack of quality differential 
that might determine considerable variations of price and demand. Choosing potatoes as the 
product for applying the above-mentioned method is justified by their homogenous character 
(unlike that of other quota agricultural products, such as apples or chicken), as well as by the 
existence of a traditional production sector which, during the past 50 years, has permanently 
covered approximately 98% of the internal consumption (except between 1989 and 1993) and 
whose position is currently jeopardised by a substantial increase in imports. 
At the same time, potatoes are the agricultural products whose imports had in 2006 
one of the fastest rises (an almost 200% increase) compared to 2005 (after pork and tobacco)
9. 
Moreover, the ratio of potatoes import value in the total amount of imports doubled in 2006 
compared to 2005 (from 0.05% to 0.1%). 
The Romanian exports, not very substantial, averaged around 6,500 tonnes per year 
during the last 10 years, with a peak of 16,000 tonnes in 2000. However, the historical trend is 
descending, as, beginning with 2004, Romanian exports witnessed a considerable loss of price 
competitiveness. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Moldova, signed in Bucharest, 15
th February 1994, ratified by Law 94/1994, consisting of the temporary 
suspension of the customs duty exception for the import of refined sugar coming from the Republic of Moldova 
to Romania and the application of the erga omnes import customs duty stipulated in the Import Customs Tariff 
of Romania for 2006, for the products listed in the appendix which forms an integrant part of this decision.” The 
same act established a tariff-rate quota of 14,000 tons exempt from customs duties for 2006. 
8 with the mention that statistics from FAOSTAT tables do not allow to identify the HS code, i.e. are based on a 
generic term of potatoes 
9 A 7.2 million € increase compared to the same period of 2005, according to the data for April 2006, from 4.194 
million to 11.357 million € (data obtained from the Ministry of Economy and Trade, the Romanian Centre for 
Promotion of Trade, “Sinteza privind evoluţii in comerţul exterior in perioada 01.01-30.04.2006”, 
http://www.dce.gov.ro/) 164  PETRU CĂTĂLIN BODEA 
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Figure-1: The average export price in Romania and the Romanian potato exports respectively (1973-2005) 
Source: own calculations, based on data obtained from the FAO Statistics Division 2006, http://faostat.fao.org 
Calculating the tariff equivalent of the tariff-rate quota implies that the implementation 
of that measure produces pressure at the level of the demand for import. The most frequently 
used indicator for this pressure is the degree of use of the quota. The figures available for 
2003
10 and 2005
11 indicate a 100% use of the tariff-rate quotas for the imports of potatoes 
from the EU, which supports the existence of a prohibitive effect that is quantifiable in the 
form of a tariff equivalent. 
4. POTATO IMPORTS IN ROMANIA 
After the fall of 1991, the internal market potato consumption was stabilised at a level 
of 4 million tonnes per year, while the average production was of 14 tons/ha. The ratio of the 
imports in the total internal consumption, although low on average (1% for the past 50 years 
and 1.37% after 1989, with peaks of almost 10% in 1990 and 1992), has had, since 2001, an 
ascending trend and reaches a level of over 2.34% in 2005. 
From the point of view of the geographical distribution of imports in 2005 (year with 
tariff-rate quota for EU countries), the first 5 countries that potatoes were imported from, 
quantitatively speaking, are Serbia and Montenegro (47% of the imports), Germany (10%), 
Netherlands (9%), Austria (8%) and Hungary (5%). Compared to 2005, in 2004, the importer 
list was led by Egypt (23% of the imports), followed by Serbia and Montenegro (17%), 
Netherlands (15%), Greece (12%) and Germany (11%). 
On average, between 1991 and 2005, the internal producer price was of 269USD/ton, 
while the average import price was of 168 USD/ton, which indicates a supplementary margin 
of the internal producer price of 60% compared to the price of imports (the margin is close to 
the customs duty outside the quota). 
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Figure-2: The evolution of the producer price, of the import price and of the ratio of  
potato imports in consumption (1991-2005) 
Source: own calculations, based on data obtained from the FAO Statistics Division 2007, http://faostat.fao.org  
                                                      
10 Imports from EU countries amounting to 26,886 tons, compared to a tariff-rate quota of 20,000 tons (source: 
our own calculations, based on the data provided by the FAO Statistics Division 2006, http://faostat.fao.org) 
11 Source: the Ministry of Economy and Trade, Trade Policies Directorate General, Licences and Tariff-Rate 
Quotas Department, “Gradul de utilizare a contingentelor tarifare preferenţiale de import, la data de 07 
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From the point of view of prices, the most competitive countries are the non EU 
countries (see figure below), while amongst EU countries are Slovakia, Belgium Austria, 
Czech Republic and Italy.  
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Figure-3: Average import prices from import partners (2005) 
Source: own calculations, based on data obtained from the FAO Statistics Division 2007, http://faostat.fao.org 
From the data available for 2006, 2005 and 2004
12, the customs duty actually applied 
outside the quota for potato imports varied between 40% and 50% (plus a customs 
commission of 0.5%); this level was taken into account within the study as a reference 
element for calculating the tariff equivalent. 
As we can see from the graph below, the margin between the import price and the 
Romanian potato producers’ price (expressed as a percentage of the average import price) 
varies between a minimal level of -292% in 1991 and a maximum of 48% in 2001, which 
means that, except for 5 of the 13 years between 1991 and 2005 (1992, 1994, 1999, 2000 and 
2001), not even the average tariff outside the quota – assumed to be 45% - could compensate 
for the lack of price competitiveness of Romanian producers, but, in spite of that, the level of 
potato imports was maintained constant under 50,000 tons.  
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Figure-4: The price margin of CIF imports over the internal producer price (% of the CIF price) and  
the evolution of the potato imports 
Source: own calculations, based on data obtained from the FAO Statistics Division 2007, http://faostat.fao.org 
This phenomenon may be explained either by the imperfect information of the 
Romanian importers, which prevented them from using this market opportunity, or – more 
likely – by the existence of a considerable conjugated tariff equivalent of non-tariff measures 
which affect the potato imports and which are mainly tariff-rate quotas and technical barriers, 
the imports being conditioned by obtaining at least 3 certificates: a phyto-sanitary certificate – 
except for the EU countries – a certificate of compliance with the trade standards for fresh 
fruit and vegetables and/or a food safety certificate
13. 
                                                      
12 Source: the Romanian Integrated Customs Tariff, http://80.96.3.68:10080/taric/web/main_RO
13 Restrictions valid in October 2006 for potato imports, source: the Romanian Integrated Customs Tariff, 
http://80.96.3.68:10080/taric/web/browsetariffi2_RO?expandelem=0701909090&Year=2006&Month=10&Day
=18&Country=----------&issection=n&checkfinal=y&impexp=1#POS , [Accessed 18.10.2006] 166  PETRU CĂTĂLIN BODEA 
5. CALCULATING THE TARIFF EQUIVALENT OF  
THE TARIFF-RATE QUOTA 
To calculate the tariff equivalent of the tariff-rate quota, the year 2005 was chosen as a 
reference year, as it was the most recent one for which we had identified statistical data 
comparable with the price of Romanian producers and with the average import potato price in 
Romania. 
While a 20,000 ton tariff-rate quota existed for the import of potatoes from the 
European Union, with a preferential tax of 18.8% (compared to the average tax of 45% 
applicable erga omnes outside the quota), from a quantitative point of view, the imports from 
EU member state had a comparative increase in 2005, compared to the previous year, by 
18,051 tonnes consequently to the preferential access of the tariff-rate quota (this import 
increase could also be explained by the decrease in the internal production from 4,2 million 
tons in 2004 to 2,9 million tonnes in 2005) 
Table 1 
 The variation of the main import indicators 2002-2005 
Indicators  EU 
COUNTRIES 
NON-EU 
COUNTRIES 
TOTAL 
imports 
Romanian 
producers’ price 
(USD/ton) 
2005*        
Imported quantity (tons)  37846  57628  95474 
Value (thousand USD)  7753  3886  11639 
Average price (USD/ton)  205  67  122 
317.47 
2004        
Imported quantity (tons)  19795  20100  39895 
Value (thousand USD)  6816  2156  8972 
Average price (USD/ton)  344  107  225 
327.64 
2003*        
Imported quantity (tons)  26886  37619  64505 
Value (thousand USD)  4816  2,402  7218 
Average price (USD/ton)  179  64  112 
302.08 
2002        
Imported quantity (tons)  6808  16414  23222 
Value (thousand USD)  1542  953  2486 
Average price (USD/ton)  226  58  107 
212.13 
* tariff-rate quota years for EU imports 
Source: own calculations, based on data obtained from the FAO Statistics Division 2007, http://faostat.fao.org 
As shown previously, if the tariff-rate quota is entirely used, the tariff equivalent of the 
quota cannot be larger than the tariff outside the quota and, in this case, following Deardorff’s 
recommendations (Deardorff, 1997:68), we shall take into account only the minimum 
between the tariff equivalent calculated based on the “price gap” method and the erga omnes 
tariff outside the quota: 
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where 
quota tariff
EU ET
.  – is the tariff equivalent of the tariff-rate quota for imports from EU (2005) 
clasic
EU ET  – is the tariff equivalent of an import quota using the classical calculation method based on 
the price differential 
EU i T  – is the erga omnes tariff outside the quota   The tariff equivalent of tariff-rate quotas…  167 
producer P  – is the average internal production price of potatoes 
EU CIF P /  – is the CIF import price of potatoes from the EU 
EU c T  – is the tariff in quota for the potato imports from the EU 
Therefore, the tariff equivalent of the tariff-rate quota for products coming from the 
EU is smaller than the 45.5% standard average tariff outside the quota. Also the 35% tariff 
equivalent of tariff-rate quota for 2005 shows a reduction from the 45% that is obtained 
following the same reasoning as above for the year 2003, which indicates a better capability 
of domestic producers in face of foreign competition compared with 2003. 
Also, by applying the classical formula for calculating the tariff equivalent of non-
tariff measures for the imports coming from non-EU countries in 2005, the resulting level is 
much higher than the one corresponding to the protection from EU products:  
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Considering that the technical barriers for imports from non-EU countries also specify 
the need for a supplementary phyto-sanitary certificate – which the EU group does not need to 
have – the tariff equivalent differential between the protection from non-EU countries and the 
protection from the EU group may be caused by this certificate, which is thus responsible for 
a tariff equivalent of 328%. 
Consequently, the synthetic table of the tariff equivalents to the non-tariff measures 
for potato imports in 2005 may be as follows: 
Table 2  
The tariff equivalent of the non-tariff barriers for the potato import in Romania in 2005 
Import origin markets  TARIFF EQUIVALENT  
EU countries  NON-EU countries 
Tariff-rate quota  35.83%  n.a. 
Technical barriers  n.a.  328% 
Source: own calculations, based on data obtained from the FAO Statistics Division 2006, http://faostat.fao.org 
The resulted 35.83% level of tariff equivalent for EU imports is smaller comparable 
with the average price wedges of non tariff barriers traditionally liberal countries in countries 
such as New Zeeland-61,8% and USA-55.1% (Ando,2005: 264-276).  
Nonetheless, The Common External Tariff duty rate erga omnes for potatoes is 11.50 
%
14  while 0% for traditional non EU exporters in Romania such as Croatia and Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 8% for countries benefiting of Generalized System of 
Preferences (less least developed countries and some South and Central American countries 
who benefit 0%) while in 2007 Turkey and Jordan had a preferential tariff quota for 2500 
tones and 2350 tones respectively.  
The results of a regression analysis of Romanian import demand for potatoes for 1990-
2005 interval having as independent variable the average import price (showing a rather low 
correlation between the two variables
15, perhaps because insufficient substitution with 
national Romanian products) show that a price decrease of 1 US $/tonne of potatoes increases 
imports with up to 322 tonnes annually.  
                                                      
14 Source: TARIC Integrated Community Tariff, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/dds/cgi-bin/tarduty?Taric 
=0701909090&SimDate=20071008&Action=1&ProdLine=80&Country=----------&Type=0&Action=1&YesNo 
=1&Indent=-1&Flag=1&Test=tarduty&Periodic=0&Download=0&Lang=EN&Description=yes, [Accessed 
08.10.2007] 
15 
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Also, based on the above mention results regarding tariff equivalent of tariff rate 
quotas for imports from EU countries, and as a consequence to the adoption of the Common 
External Tariff, the average nominal protection for Romanian producers is expected to drop in 
average with 35%
16 after January 2007. Based on 2005 level of average import price this 
represents an exposure of local producers to import prices decreased with 43 US $/imported 
tonne of potatoes which therefore might generates caeteris paribus an increase of imports of 
almost 14,000 tonnes annually (approximately 15% increase compared with the 2005 level of 
imports and 23% compared with the average annual imports between 1990-2005). 
6. CONCLUSION 
The paper has presented one methodology of calculating the tariff equivalent of the 
tariff-rate quota for an agricultural product imported in Romania based on recommendations 
in international literature. The conclusion of this study is that the protection provided to the 
Romanian potato producers in 2005 by the tariff-rate quota of imports from the EU is 
approximately 35%, smaller than the 2003 level of the same indicator and also than the 45% 
tariff outside the quota. Nonetheless this is considerable higher when compared with the 
Common External Tariff duty rate erga omnes for potatoes of 11.50 %
 not to mention the 0% 
duty for traditional non EU exporters of potatoes in Romania such as Croatia and Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Therefore the post 2007 level of protection for national 
producers of potatoes is expected to be considerably lowered compared with the previous 
price wedge ensured by the Romanian tariff quotas applied to potatoes imports from EU and 
erga omnes duty rate applied to imports from non-EU countries. Based on a basic import 
regression coefficient, the elimination of the average 35% nominal protection level as 
consequence of the adoption the Common External Tariff is expected to stimulate imports 
pressure especially from price competitive import partners both from EU (Slovakia, Belgium, 
Austria, Czech Republic and Italy) and non EU countries (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia and Croatia) and rise annual imports with at least 13,5 thousand tonnes, thus an 
increase of 23% compared with the average annual imports between 1990-2005. 
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